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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the Nuremberg Trials after World War II, Alfred Rosenberg, head 
of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), was convicted of war 
crimes including plunder and pillage for orchestrating the systematic and 
unlawful taking of works of art.1  Tens of thousands of works were taken 
from private collections and public museums.  Some were destined for 
Hitler’s planned museum in his hometown of Linz, Austria, some were 
sold for war funds, and some were just destroyed as degenerate art.2
After the war, commissions were established to assist in the return of 
looted art works.3  Much was, in fact, returned.  Yet sixty years later, the 
 1. The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 156-58 (1946).  Alfred Rosenberg was 
charged in the Nuremberg Trial with all four criminal counts of crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Id.  Included in the war crimes definition was 
the “plunder of public or private property.”  Id. at 113.  The Nuremberg Tribunal found 
the evidence of war crimes so overwhelming that it dealt with them generally, noting that 
the Nazis implemented a systemic plunder of public or private property, including a 
“wholesale seizure” of art treasures.  Id. at 113, 122. 
Rosenberg is responsible for a system of organized plunder of both public and 
private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe.  Acting under 
Hitler’s orders of January 1940, to set up the “Hohe Schule,” he organized and 
directed the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg,” which plundered museums and libraries, 
confiscated art treasures and collections, and pillaged private houses.  His own 
records show the extent of the confiscations.  In “Action-M” (Moebel), 
instituted in December 1941 at Rosenberg’s suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes 
were plundered in the West, 38,000 of them in Paris alone, and it took 26,984 
railroad cars to transport the confiscated furnishings to Germany.  As of July 
14, 1944, more than 21,903 art objects, including famous paintings and 
museum pieces, had been seized by the Einsatzstab in the West. 
Id. at 157. 
 2. There are a number of excellent, and chilling, sources describing Hitler’s 
vision for purifying and collecting art.  Chief among them is LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE 
RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).  See also HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE 
NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (Tim Bent & 
Hector Feliciano trans., 1997); THE SPOILS OF WAR (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997). 
 3. See, e.g., Craig Hugh Smyth, The Establishment of the Munich Collecting Point, in 
THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 126-30; Rebecca L. Garrett, Time for a Change? 
Restoring Nazi-Looted Artwork to its Rightful Owners, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 367, 370-
72 (2000). 
Within two weeks of the German surrender, General Eisenhower, as Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces, issued orders establishing collecting points for looted art.  
Munich was chosen as one of the Central Collecting Points (CCP), and it was originally 
conceived to be a storage facility.  However, its scope quickly included “de facto 
RHODES POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 11/20/2006  1:21 PM 
[VOL. 43:  495, 2006]  On Art Theft, Tax, and Time 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 497 
 
fallout from the art looting remains unfinished, as owners and heirs of 
owners continue to search for and sometimes find their missing works.4  
Aided by technology and international arts organizations, newly released 
public records, and changing attitudes for a restorative justice, when 
looted art is located today, the work’s return to the original owner from 
the current owner is no longer a linear administrative matter.  Time has 
rendered the process a private legal one, sometimes with governmental 
or political overtones.  In the emotionally charged and exceedingly 
contentious legal sphere, the expectations of legitimate ownership rights 
of each of the innocent parties collide.  This impossible triangle of thief, 
owner, and innocent buyer—described centuries ago—remains.5
Having one’s day in court is central to our legal system.  As in most 
litigation, the parties in looted art cases often end the legal challenge 
with a privately negotiated settlement.6  The pressure to settle is 
responsibility for repatriation.”  Craig Hugh Smyth, The Establishment of the Munich 
Collecting Point, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 129. 
When accredited representatives of looted countries were invited to have 
offices in the Collecting Point and to document, with the help of staff, the 
ownership of objects, in order to prove they were from their countries, the 
officer-in-charge had to rule on whether the documentation was sufficient for 
an object to be released for repatriation—easy to do at the start for the Ghent 
Altarpiece (fig. 64) or Michelangelo’s Bruges Madonna (fig. 65).  Other 
shipments were less spectacular.  The difficult problems arose [later]. 
Id. 
  When the last Director of the Munich CCP arrived, he found that: 
[W]ork at the Munich CCP continued in its orderly routine.  Lists were 
reviewed and checked against claims and works in storage.  New claimants 
were directed to make very specific descriptions of what they had lost, when, 
and how.  Appointed representatives of the nations occupied by Germany 
(especially France, the Netherlands, and Belgium) assisted in the process.  
When a work had been identified as having come from such a nation after the 
date of occupation, it was returned to the government of that nation.  To that 
source, the owner could then make a claim for restitution. 
S. Lane Faison, Jr., Transfer of Custody to the Germans, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra 
note 2, at 140 (italics in original). 
In the case of DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the court 
recounts how Mrs. DeWeerth unsuccessfully reported her Monet’s disappearance to the 
military government for the Bonn-Cologne area after the war. 
 4. See, e.g., Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5862 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005) (discussing recent allegations against actress 
Elizabeth Taylor); Dutch to Return Nazi-Seized Paintings to Heir, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 
2006, at A11.  
 5. See, e.g., Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory 
of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 95 (1991). 
 6. Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading with the Enemy: 
Holocaust Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28 




understandable in all cases, but especially so when the ownership of a 
unique work of art is in question; a Solomonic judgment is just not 
viable.7  Commentators have urged the formation of new specialized 
commissions and rules for these disputes to streamline the process, to 
bring a measure of uniformity and predictability, and thereby to calm the 
chaos of a worldwide art market.8
Beyond the emotionally draining pull of any dispute, many publicized 
cases involve property worth significant amounts, often millions of 
dollars.9  This monetary dimension can make prompt resolution of 
claims unlikely.  Continuing emergence of disputes over Nazi-looted art 
coupled with the strong desire and policy to resolve these disputes 
between the two innocents, leads to examining all potentially productive 
strategies including tax.  Tax is not a neat and tidy doctrinal solution, 
rather the appeal of tax as a strategy to assist in resolving disputed art 
cases lies in its pragmatic and familiar everyman nature.  The United 
States income tax system routinely balances dynamic and competing 
policies, such as revenue raising, economic stimulation, and horizontal 
and vertical equity, that often yield to normative concerns.10  Tax 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 683, 711 (2003); Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and 
Should Be Done, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 659-61 (1998); infra Part III (discussing 
Greece v. Ward and Goodman v. Searle). 
 7. King Solomon’s order to cut the baby in half revealed the true mother—and 
King Solomon’s wisdom.  1 Kings 3:16-:28 (King James).  A similar order today to cut 
the art in half would, of course, destroy the art without revealing the “true” owner.  What 
if a judge, however, were able to cut the legal ownership in half, and not the art?  Each of 
the two innocent parties could conceivably be declared the owner of an undivided one-
half interest in the work of art.  Undivided co-ownership interests are common in real 
property and partnerships; there is no theoretical reason why co-ownership interest in art 
could not exist.  Practical concerns such as possession schedules and insurance could 
hamper such a resolution, but such concerns are not insurmountable. 
An increasingly common technique in gifting valuable works of art (especially to 
museums but also to one’s children or heirs) is to create undivided fractional ownership 
interests.  This allows a taxpayer to transfer an interest in the work to a charity and stay 
within the quantitative limitations of the charitable deduction for income tax purposes.  
See Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The Intersection of Art and Tax, 26 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 179, 193-96 (2003); Rachel Emma Silverman, Joint Custody for 
Your Monet, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2005, at D1. 
 8. Rebecca Keim, Filling the Gap Between Morality and Jurisprudence: The Use 
of Binding Arbitration to Resolve Claims of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen Art, 3 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 295 (2003); Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the 
Role of the Museum: A Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 15 (1998); Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to 
Resolve Disputes Related to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War II, 10 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 27 (1999). 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 10. The deduction for home mortgage interest is but one example.  See, e.g., Roberta F. 
Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage 
Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and 
Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986). 
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provides a structure amenable to striking balances as perceptions and 
impact shift over time.  Equally important for the individuals involved, 
the tax structure would not require a determination of wrongdoing or 
wrongful conduct on the part of either of the two innocents. 
This Article will examine ways in which the tax code can be used in 
fashioning settlements between individuals over disputed Nazi-looted 
art.11  Part II provides an overview of Nazi-era art looting.  Part III 
examines the income tax charitable deduction as a tool in settling 
disputes.  Part IV explores the theft loss deduction as a possible tool in 
crafting settlements.  Part V discusses the policy ramifications of using 
the tax code to resolve these private art disputes and proposes allowing a 
theft loss deduction when Nazi-looted art is returned to the owner. 
II.  NAZI LOOTING OF ART 
When Adolf Hitler came to power, his “revolution [was not] only 
political and economic.  It [was] above all cultural.”12  This cultural 
 11. The primary focus of this Article is on art ownership controversies between 
individuals—not disputes involving an ownership claim of a sovereign government.  
This is not because government claims are less contentious (consider the 
Elgin/Parthenon marbles controversy), rather, the obvious differences of history, 
resources, and intergovernmental foreign relations can skew discussion.  See Hugh 
Eakin, Italy Goes on the Offensive with Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at E1. 
No discussion of contested ownership of cultural property can ignore the 
Elgin/Parthenon marbles dispute; it is undoubtedly the prime example of the difficulty of 
these cases.  Between 1801 and 1812, Lord Elgin removed many of the remaining 
marble statues from the ruins of the Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens and sent them 
to London.  See, e.g., John Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1881 (1985).  In 1816, he sold them to the British Museum, where they remain 
housed and known as the “The Elgin Marbles.”  Id.  From the beginning, there was 
controversy in England and Greece over the proper ownership of these marbles.  Id.  In 
1983, the Greek government formally requested the return of the “Parthenon marbles,” 
and in 1984, the British government formally rejected the Greek claim to the “Elgin 
marbles.”  Id. 
The controversy continues today, two hundred years after the removal, and is perhaps  
even intensifying as cultural property and its role in society emerges as an extremely 
important topic in the academy and the popular press.  See, e.g., Christine K. Knox, 
They’ve Lost Their Marbles: 2002 Universal Museum Declaration, The Elgin Marbles 
and the Future of the Repatriation Movement, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 315 
(2006). 
 12. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 6, quoting from a speech of the director of the 
Combat League for German Culture in 1933.  That speech continued: 
[A]lready it has uncovered long hidden sources of German folkways, has 
opened paths to that new . . . awareness that all the expressions of life spring 
from a specific blood . . . a specific race! . . . Art is not international. . . . If 
anyone should ask: What is left of freedom?  he will be answered: there is no 




prong initially manifested itself in the 1930s with a purification of art; 
that is, the elevation of Hitler’s preferred romantic Germanic art and a 
purging of modern, degenerate art from German museums.13  When the 
Nazi revolution moved beyond Germany to the invasion of other 
countries, the art looting similarly escalated, accompanied by an 
increasingly blatant anti-Semitism and a renewed nationalism.  The 
private art collections owned by Jewish families in Austria, for example, 
were expropriated almost immediately after the Austrian Anschlus 
invasion in 1938,14 and the great collections of Jewish families in France 
were systematically tracked down and confiscated.  Art treasures held in 
museums, churches, or private collections that had been previously 
“plundered” from Germans were to be repatriated to Germany in 
accordance with lists drawn up in advance of military operations.15  As 
military operations became more widespread, so did the looting of art.  
But even by early summer 1939, the sheer amount of confiscated and 
safeguarded art was overwhelming.  Order needed to be imposed.  Hitler 
authorized Hans Posse to “build up the new art museum” for his 
hometown of Linz.16  The priorities were straightforward: the Fuhrer 
Reserve had first choice among the looted works, then German museums 
could make selections, finally the remainder was sold at auctions or 
through dealers.17
freedom for those who would weaken and destroy German art . . . there must 
be no remorse and no sentimentality in uprooting and crushing what was 
destroying our vitals. 
Id. 
 13. See id. at 3-6 for a description of a 1939 auction of degenerate art from 
German museums’ collections of Picasso, Van Gogh, Klee, Braque, Matisse, Kokoschka, 
and others. 
 14. Id. at 38.  See, for example, FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 24-46, for a 
description of the “Exemplary Looting of the Rothschild Collections.” 
 15. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 24-26. 
Already sketched out in Hitler’s writings was a plan to repatriate works of art 
taken from Germany and dispersed throughout the world. . . . Hitler [ordered] the 
eminent art historian Otto Kümmel . . . . to compile an exhaustive list of German 
art held in foreign countries since the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
   Kümmel’s research culminated in three volumes . . . . Their vast work 
remained a secret for the entirety of the war. 
   [T]he Kümmel Report overlooked nothing. . . . What was essential was that 
the German people had been geraubt, despoiled, of their heritage . . . . But the 
report’s demands also had a historical significance that went deep into the 
German nationalism: They were to erase the humiliation of the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919, which ended World War I, and to restore to German culture 
the central place that Nazis thought was its birthright. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 16. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 44. 
 17. Id. at 45.  In practice, however, after Hitler made his choices, Hermann 
Goering, working through the ERR, made his selections for his personal art collection to 
be housed at his estate, Carinhall.  See, e.g., FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 31-40. 
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Hitler, of course, did not invent the wartime looting of art works.18  
Yet the breathtaking scope of the Nazi plunder, its systematic approach, 
and involvement at the highest levels was unmatched in history.  Even 
sixty years later, we do not know all that was taken, who took it, its 
continued existence or its whereabouts.19  What we do know is that  
there is worldwide interest in dealing with the issue today.20
 18. History affords many examples of victors carrying off the spoils of war.  The 
Old Testament tells us of the siege of Jerusalem by the Babylonians under King 
Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C. and the plunder of Solomon’s temple: “[T]he bowls, and 
the cauldrons, and the candlesticks, and the spoons, and the cups; that which was of gold 
in gold and that which was of silver in silver, took the captain of the guard away.”  
Jeremia 52:19 (King James).  The Arch of Titus in the Roman Forum was erected in 
A.D. 81 to commemorate the victory of Titus in Jerusalem.  One relief in particular 
shows rather vividly the victors displaying their plunder, including a Menorah from 
Herod’s Temple.  See generally Jeanette Greenfield, The Spoils of War, in THE SPOILS OF 
WAR, supra note 2, at 34-38.  The exquisite four horses of San Marco in Venice were 
taken by the Crusaders from the Hippodrome during the sack of Constantinople in 1204.  
Six centuries later, these very same horses were taken by Napoleon in 1797 and paraded 
triumphantly in Paris in 1798.  After Napoleon’s military defeats in 1814 and 1815, the 
four horses were returned to San Marco through the Convention of Paris in 1815.  
During World War II, these horses were removed for safekeeping.  Today the original 
four horses are inside San Marco and copies stand in the facade.  Id. 
Nor is it likely that art looting is of historic interest only.  See Amy E. Miller, The 
Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn Away Leisurely from the Disaster, 
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 49 (2005) (arguing the United States is liable for a breach of 
international law by allowing art looting in Iraq). 
 19. Estimates as to the amount of plunder of works of art during the war vary 
considerably.  For example, one estimate is that one-fifth of all Western art was seized 
by the Nazis.  Kaye, supra note 6, at 657.  Another is that 220,000 works of art, valued at 
$2.5 billion in 1945 and $20.5 billion in 2003 were seized.  Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra 
note 6, at 709.  Another estimate indicates “600,000 important works” were seized while 
“[a]s many as 100,000 pieces are still . . . missing.”  Ralph Blumenthal, New Efforts to 
Recover Nazi Plunder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at E1.  Most likely, “[t]he total amount of 
loot will never be known; it has proved beyond man’s capacity to accurately compute.”  
WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH  943 (1960). 
The stereotype of official impeccable German recordkeeping only goes so far.  Even 
good records are lost, have misattributions, and contain inaccurate information.  
Additionly, personal human greed plays a role.  Unauthorized and unofficial takings of 
others’ property by officials, neighbors, and others were commonplace.  Some property 
demonstrably taken by Germany was later “restituted” as reparations to the Soviet 
Union, sometimes officially, sometimes not.  See, e.g., Margaret M. Mastroberardino, 
The Last Prisoners of World War II, 9 PACE INT’L L. REV. 315 (1997); Silvia L. Depta, 
Comment, Twice Saved or Twice Stolen?: The Trophy Art Tug-of-War Between Russia 
and Germany, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 371 (1996). 
 20. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 710. 
The worldwide movement to recover Nazi-looted art also has its roots in the 
United States.  In late 1998, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Museum hosted the Washington Conference on 
Holocaust-Era Assets at the U.S. Department of State.  Forty-four governments, as 




III.  CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
The charitable deduction has been part of the federal income tax 
system since 1917.21  While there have been periodic reforms to section 
170 over time, the basic outline has remained fairly constant for most 
taxpayers: donations by taxpayers to qualified charities can qualify for 
an income tax deduction.  However, once the charitable gift moves from 
a monetary one to a work of art, qualitative and quantitative statutory 
and regulatory requirements become extremely demanding.22  Despite 
the complexity, there are two variations where buyers in disputed art 
cases have successfully used the charitable deduction in fashioning a 
settlement.  One involved stolen antiquities returned to the Greek 
government using a U.S. charity as a conduit; the other involved the 
transfer of a Nazi-looted work of art to a U.S. museum. 
A. Greece v. Ward: Mycenaean Treasure from Aidonia 
In April 1993, the Michael Ward Gallery, a prominent antiquities 
gallery in New York, announced a show entitled “Gold of the Mycenaeans,” 
featuring a rare collection of Greek antiquities dating from the 15th 
century BC.23  The exhibition catalogue showed a collection of gold 
jewelry and artifacts, with the collection’s price set at $1,500,000.  The 
well as numerous international non-governmental organizations, sent 
delegations to the conference to deal with Nazi-stolen assets, including artwork 
found throughout the world.  The conference was designed as an international 
effort. . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  One result of the meeting was the development of a set of 
nonbinding principles, the Washington Conference Principles of Nazi-Confiscated Art.  
Those principles aim to provide transparency in art provenance and to facilitate the 
restitution of Nazi-looted art across many different countries and different legal systems, 
a technique that has been called “narrative norms.”  Eric Jayme, Globalization in Art 
Law: Clash of Interests and International Tendencies, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927, 
943 (2005).  Although the agreed upon principles are nonbinding, they nevertheless may 
impact the law over time as courts are called upon to consider questions of interpretation 
and construction of statutes.  Id.  These norms can and have played a role beyond the 
judiciary, as legislatures consider resolutions or new statutes, and the executive branch 
takes action.  See infra note 77.  Moreover, many museums have now fashioned 
proactive statements on provenance.  See, e.g., American Association of Museums, 
Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era 
(1999), http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/upload/ethicsguidelines_naziera.pdf. 
 21. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (Supp. 2001).  The charitable deduction debuted in a tax bill 
that raised tax rates to help finance the cost of America’s entry into World War I.  The 
concern then as now was that as income tax rates would rise, donations to charities 
would fall.  “Now, when war comes and we impose these very heavy taxes on incomes, 
that will be the first place where the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, 
in donations to charity.”  55 CONG. REC. 65, 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis). 
 22. See RALPH LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1554-1604 (3d ed. 2005). 
 23. Emily C. Ehl, Comment, The Settlement of Greece v. Ward: Who Loses?, 78 
B.U. L. REV. 661, 674 (1998). 
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collection was stunning, not only for its obvious aesthetic value, but to 
some antiquities experts, for its obvious similarity to looted Mycenaean 
cemetery treasures from Aidonia.24  The government of Greece, having 
reviewed the catalogue, contacted the Ward Gallery to demand the 
return of its cultural property.  The demand was unsuccessful.  Within 
two weeks of the rejection, Greece filed a lawsuit in the Southern 
District of New York requesting that the sale be enjoined and that 
Greece be declared the owner of the collection.25  For seven months, 
negotiations continued on the case. 
Michael Ward, the Director of the Ward Gallery, was a prominent 
scholar-dealer and a member of a U.S. presidential panel concerning art 
smuggling.26  He was determined to end the controversy without further 
litigation.27  A direct transfer of the disputed collection to Greece would 
certainly have done so, but instead the dispute created a triangulation of 
ownership interests. 
The Society for the Preservation of the Greek Heritage, a Washington 
based 501(c)(3) charity, agreed to accept the donation of the collection 
from the Ward Gallery, and the Greek government simultaneously 
agreed to drop its claim against the Ward Gallery.28  The charitable 
deduction under the Internal Revenue Code served as the critical link.  
For a transfer of property to a recognized public charity, the Ward 
Gallery could deduct the donation of the tangible personal property as 
long as the use of the tangible property was related to the charity’s 
purposes.29  The Gallery would need to ascertain that the charity did not 
 24. Ricardo J. Elia, Greece v. Ward: The Return of Mycenaean Artifacts, 4 INT’L J. 
CULTURAL PROP. 119, 121 n.17 (1995); see also Mary Williams Walsh, A Grecian 
Treasure: Back from the Grave?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at A1 (“When American 
experts familiar with the late Grecian Bronze Age saw a photo of the sale pieces 
accompanying a report on the upcoming auction in the New York Times, they could not 
believe their eyes.”). 
 25. Greece v. Ward, No. 93 Civ. 3493 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1993). 
 26. Elia, supra note 24, at 120, 124 (“The irony that the gallery director is a 
member of . . . a presidential committee . . . was widely noted . . . .”); see also Walsh 
supra note 24 (“Ward’s prominence in the cultural preservation world [was a factor in 
favor of Greece’s claim].  No ordinary gallery owner, he had a strong scholarly interest 
and sat on the U.S. Cultural Property Advisory Committee . . . . ‘It was a very difficult 
position for Mr. Ward,’ [the director of antiquities for Greek Ministry of culture] said.”). 
 27. Norman Hammond, Looted Gold Goes Back to Greece, TIMES (London), Jan. 
20, 1994, at 20. 
 28. Elia, supra note 24, at 122. 
 29. Because of Ward’s status as a dealer with respect to the Mycenaean antiquities 
(and not as a collector), the deduction would be limited to the taxpayer’s basis, and not 




intend to sell the property or put it to an unrelated use.  What was that 
intended use?  It was to transfer the property back to Greece.  By 
triangulating the transfer through a conduit charity, Mr. Ward and the 
Greek government were able to settle their controversy. 
B. Goodman v. Searle: Landscape with Smokestacks 
Daniel C. Searle purchased a Degas pastel-over-monotype, Landscape 
with Smokestacks, for $850,000 in July 1987.30  A member of the Art 
Institute of Chicago’s Board of Trustees, Mr. Searle, was informed by 
the Art Institute of the availability of the Degas and its desirability.31  
But for a lack of acquisition funds, the Art Institute itself would have 
purchased the Degas.32  The Art Institute made arrangements for Mr. 
Searle to view the Degas at the apartment of its then current owner in 
New York; at Mr. Searle’s request, the landscape was sent to the Art 
Institute for inspection.33  It was given a “clean bill of health.”34  Seven 
years after his purchase, Mr. Searle loaned the Degas to the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York for an exhibition.  Grandsons of Friedrich 
and Louise Gutmann, who were killed in the Holocaust, saw the 
catalogue for the exhibition and recognized the work as one that had 
the fair market value.  26 U.S.C. § 170(e)(I)(A) (Supp. 2001).  Ward’s cost was reportedly 
$150,000.  See Hammond, supra note 27; Walsh, supra note 24. 
 30. HOWARD J. TRIENENS, LANDSCAPE WITH SMOKESTACKS 11 (2000).  Mr. Trienens 
was counsel for Mr. Searle, the defendant collector.  Id. at XIV.  One reason he wrote the 
book was his belief that the media oversimplified the story.  Id. 
   As reported by the media, the story is straightforward. . . . 
   As the facts emerged in the course of litigation, however, the straightforward 
media story turned out to be complex. . . . 
   . . . . 
   This book’s purpose is not to solve the mystery of what actually happened to 
the landscape.  Rather, the purpose is to describe what lies beneath the surface 
of the press reports and television programs.  This provides a more intriguing, 
if more ambiguous, story. 
   As what is known of the story of Landscape with Smokestacks is revealed, 
genuine questions emerge about the capacity of our judicial system to deal 
with cases of this kind and, perhaps more significantly, the performance of the 
media in such an emotionally charged atmosphere. 
Id. at XIII-XIV. 
Thomas R. Kline of Washington D.C. represented the Gutmann family.  When the 
case was transferred to Chicago, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd. became local counsel for the 
Gutmann family.  I, Anne-Marie Rhodes, was then and remain now as Of Counsel at 
Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.  Although not directly involved, I was certainly aware of the 
case.  I cite Mr. Trienen’s book primarily because it is well-written and germane, but 
also because like Mr. Trienens, it might be difficult for me to “escape the charge that 
[this] is slanted in [the client’s] favor . . . .”  Id. at XIV. 
 31. Id. at 8. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. Id. at 8. 
 34. Id. at 11. 
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belonged to their grandparents.35  With their aunt Lili Gutmann, Nick 
and Simon Goodman sued Daniel Searle in July 1996, for the return of 
the Degas.36  The controversy was highly publicized by both print and 
broadcast media.37  The value of the Degas was estimated to be 
$1,100,000.38  On the eve of trial in summer 1998, the parties settled 
their litigation.39  The charitable deduction played a role. 
The settlement agreement provided that each of Lili Gutmann, Nick 
Goodman, Simon Goodman, and Daniel Searle would transfer her or his 
ownership interest in the Degas to the Art Institute of Chicago.40  Daniel 
Searle’s transfer would be a gift of his interest; the Gutmann family 
transfers would be sales.  The total sales price would be one-half of the 
then fair market value of the Degas.  Fair market value would be the 
average of two independently prepared appraisals.  One of the appraisers 
would be chosen by the Gutmann family from a list of individual 
appraisers prepared by the Art Institute; the other appraiser, also to be 
chosen by the Gutmann family, would be Christie’s or Sotheby’s.  The 
Gutmanns chose Richard Feigen and Christie’s.41
In November 1998, the Art Institute informed the parties that Mr. 
Feigen had appraised the Degas at $575,000, while Christie’s had 
appraised it at $300,000.42  The average therefore was $437,500, one 
half of which is $218,750.  Mr. Searle would use these appraisals in 
preparing his income tax return and claiming a charitable deduction for 
his one-half interest valued at $218,750.  Disappointed with the 
appraisals, the Gutmanns did not accept the Art Institute’s tender of the 
$218,750 in payment for their collective one-half interest; instead, the 
 35. Id. at 15; see also Hector Feliciano et al., Nazi-Stolen Art, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 
67, 89 (1998) (“Now, my brother and I started looking everywhere. . . . Pretty quickly we 
found the Degas landscape . . . . It was in an exhibit in the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
in New York in 1994 and was . . . owned by Daniel Searle.”). 
 36. TRIENENS, supra note 30, at 28-34; see also Goodman v. Searle, No. 96 CV 
5310 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1996), transferred to No. 96 C6459 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  Except 
when referring to specific individuals, this Article will refer to the Gutmann (and not the 
Goodman) family, using the common ancestral name. 
 37. TRIENENS, supra note 30, at 28-34.  Print media included articles in the Los 
Angeles Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Boston Globe, ARTNews, 
and Chicago Magazine.  The story was broadcast on National Public Radio, the CBS 
program 60 Minutes, and on public television.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 12. 
 39. Id. at 86, 93. 
 40. Id. at 93-94. 
 41. Id. at 94. 
 42. Id. at 94-95. 




Gutmanns requested a reappraisal.43  Mr. Feigen did not revise his 
valuation, but in April 1999, Christie’s raised its valuation by $100,000 
in light of a November 1998 sale of another Degas pastel.  The new 
average therefore was $487,500, one-half of which, $243,750, the Art 
Institute paid to the Gutmann family for their ownership interests.44  Mr. 
Searle was able therefore to claim an amount $25,000 higher as a 
charitable deduction on his income tax return.  By each side recognizing 
at some level an ownership interest of the other, and then by both 
triangulating their interests to create ownership in a new third party, the 
dispute was resolved.  Today, Landscape with Smokestacks hangs in the 
Art Institute with a plaque reflecting its prior dual ownership, a 
“purchase from the collection of Fritz and Louise Gutmann and a gift of 
Daniel C. Searle.”45
Mr. Searle paid $850,000 for the Degas in 1987 and received a 
$243,750 charitable deduction for the transfer of his ownership interest 
in 1998 to the Art Institute.  Mr. Searle clearly suffered an economic 
loss.  Was another tax approach available? 
IV. THEFT LOSS DEDUCTION 
Internal Revenue Code section 165(a) provides a general deduction for 
losses sustained in a taxable year, with subsection (c)(3) restricting 
individual taxpayers’ personal, non-business losses to those arising from 
“fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”46  No statutory 
definition of theft exists; the regulations provide merely that theft is 
“deemed to include, but shall not necessarily be limited to, larceny, 
embezzlement, and robbery.”47  Cases and rulings under section 165(c)(3) 
nevertheless have drawn a tight line as to what constitutes a theft and 
routinely distinguish theft losses from other losses, with the two 
elements of criminality and timing having particular prominence and 
relevance. 
To claim a theft loss, a taxpayer first must prove an illegal, wrongful 
taking, not just that the property is missing.48  In the textbook case 
 43. Nick Goodman had been quoted as saying he was “looking for a value of about 
$1 million.”  Id. at 95. 
 44. Id. at 95-96. 
 45. Ron Grossman, How a Family’s Degas Traveled from Their Estate to the 
Center of Controversy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2001, sec. 7, at 14. 
 46. 26 U.S.C. § 165 (2000).  Other casualty and theft were added to the section in 
1916.  Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759.  The 1913 original 
enactment of the federal income tax had provided only for “fires, storms, or shipwreck.”  
Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 114, 167. 
 47. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (2005). 
 48. Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60. 
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illustrating theft loss, Mary Frances Allen was not allowed a theft loss 
deduction for the loss of her brooch.49  Mrs. Allen had only proven that 
she had worn her brooch to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York, that it was crowded that day, and that a search at the Metropolitan 
did not uncover the brooch.  For the majority, that offer of evidence, 
although proving a loss, did not prove a loss from theft.  The court 
reminded observers that not all losses are tax deductible. 
Second, the taking must be illegal and done with criminal intent, with 
illegality determined under the law of the state where the taking 
occurred.50  For thefts of a routine nature, say auto thefts, this is not a 
particularly stringent standard.  In the context of a foreign country’s 
expropriation or nationalization of a taxpayer’s personal property, 
however, using the internal law of that country to determine illegality 
seldom yields a deduction for the taxpayer.51  The Farcasanu case 
discussed below illustrates the harsh application of the theft loss 
deduction in the context of foreign expropriation of private property, and 
reflects the chaos of the 1940’s especially well.52
A. Farcasanu, Foreign Expropriation, and the Act of State Doctrine 
Mrs. Farcasanu was the wife of the U.S. Minister to Rumania in 1937, 
and as was then customary, she and her husband furnished their living 
quarters with their own property including rare and valuable furniture, 
antiquities, and art.53  Eleven days after Rumania declared war on the 
United States in December 1941, Mrs. Farcasanu’s husband died from 
leukemia.  She was forced to flee Bucharest in such great haste that she 
even had to leave her deceased husband’s remains in Rumania. 
By the time Mrs. Farcasanu was first able to return to Rumania in 
November 1945, the Communists were in control.  Though she wished 
to leave, the head of the American Mission persuaded her to stay, 
 49. Allen v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 163 (1951). 
 50. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956); see also Martin J. 
McMahon, Annotation, What Constitutes Tax Deductible Theft Loss Under 26 USCS § 
165, 98 A.L.R. FED. 229 (1990). 
 51. Alan Epstein, Note, Foreign Expropriation Losses of Personal Assets: Should 
a Deduction be Allowed Under Internal Revenue Code Section 165(c)(3)?, 40 TAX LAW. 
211, 231 (1986). 
 52. Farcasanu v. Comm’r, 436 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1970), aff’g 50 T.C. 881 
(1968).  The summary of facts is drawn from the court’s opinion and will generally not 
be footnoted separately. 
 53. Id. 




viewing her personal connections to the royal family as an important 
political advantage.  In early 1947, Mrs. Farcasanu once again returned 
to the United States in great haste due to a family emergency.  Mrs. 
Farcasanu requested the State Department to ship her property back to 
America, but it declined for fear of antagonizing the Rumanian 
government.  Thereafter, Mrs. Farcasanu’s personal property was nationalized 
by the Rumanian government. 
In 1956, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission awarded Mrs. 
Farcasanu $103,445 of her requested $295,716.  When it appeared that 
no additional compensation would be forthcoming, Mrs. Farcasanu 
claimed a theft loss deduction on her 1959 income tax return.  The Tax 
Court upheld the Service’s denial of the deduction.54
In a per curiam opinion affirming the denial, the court of appeals 
acknowledged that theft under section 165 is “defined broadly,” but also 
that theft must be determined under the law of the situs of the taking, 
and always requires a criminal intent.55  In cases of foreign expropriation 
of private property, the court noted that cases have drawn a “sharp 
distinction . . . between takings . . . made under color of governmental 
authority, and takings . . . in clear violation of the commands of the 
sovereign.”56  As long as the confiscating official acted under “color of 
legal authority, arbitrary and despotic as it may have been,” there can be 
no “theft for tax deduction purposes.”57
Farcasanu gives active tax support to the Act of State doctrine that: 
[T]he Judicial Branch [of the United States government] will not examine the 
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign 
government extant and recognized by the country at the time of the suit, in the 
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal 
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary 
international law.58
 54. Farcasanu, 50 T.C. 881 (1968). 
 55. Farcasanu, 436 F.2d at 149. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).  It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to delve deeply into the highly complex and porous Act of State 
doctrine.  It is important to note, however, the Supreme Court held in 2004 that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not prohibit Maria Altmann, the niece and heir of 
a prominent Jewish art collector, from pursuing a private cause of action in the United 
States federal court system against the Austrian government for the return of six Gustav 
Klimt paintings that had belonged to her family before the Nazi takeover.  Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).  On January 15, 2006, an Austrian arbitration 
panel determined that the Klimts were wrongfully acquired by the Austrian museum and 
ordered their return to the family.  “Austrian Arbitration Court: Maria Altmann and Dr. 
Neil Averspurg versus the Republic of Austria,” American Society of International Law, 
http://www.asil.org/ilib/2006/03/ilib06031.htm#j5 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).  The paintings 
arrived shortly thereafter in Los Angeles, “a dream come true” for Maria Altmann.  Daisy 
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Hence, the court believed the Act of State doctrine precluded it from 
evaluating the expropriation as a theft. 
Despite this harsh precedent denying a theft loss deduction for foreign 
expropriation, the Act of State doctrine may not necessarily foreclose a 
theft deduction when Nazi-looted art is returned to the original owner.  
First, one may argue the doctrine itself was inappropriately incorporated 
into the tax system.59  Simply put, a deduction by a taxpayer under the 
Internal Revenue Code does not interfere with the President’s ability to 
set foreign policy, involve the U.S. Government in the internal affairs of 
a sovereign state, or pose a threat to that sovereign’s assets.  The realm 
of the doctrine is international diplomacy, not the Form 1040.  Second, 
even if the Act of State doctrine is relevant to the Code, the facts of a 
particular case may negate its application. 
Nguyen, Inheritor of Stolen Klimts Welcomes Paintings to L.A., CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2006, 
sec. 1, at 6.  By June 2006, the magnificent portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I by Klimt had 
been sold by the heirs, reportedly for a record $135 million, to the Neue Galerie in New 
York.  The Neue Galerie is a museum specializing in Austrian and German art and the 
subject of its famous acquisition has been described by Ronald S. Lauder, a founder of 
the museum, as “our Mona Lisa.”  Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for 
a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at E1. 
It would indeed be ironic if the Act of State doctrine, which does not now prevent a 
private cause of action against a foreign government from proceeding in the United 
States, continues to prohibit a U.S. taxpayer from claiming a theft loss deduction for 
income tax purposes. 
 59. Epstein, supra note 51, at 228-30. 
   Unfortunately, the courts have indiscriminately incorporated the Act of State 
doctrine into the law of federal income taxation without expressing any 
substantive reasons to support this incorporation.  In fact, the doctrine’s 
adoption partially appears to be the product of trial tactics. . . . Farcasanu filed 
several motions for a continuance based on her concession “that the case of 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino then pending before the Supreme Court 
was ‘controlling on the issue of whether “nationalization” is a “theft”‘ for the 
purpose of a deduction for theft loss. . .”  Because Sabbatino held that an 
American court could not characterize an expropriatory act as a theft, the Tax 
Court logically concluded that Farcasanu’s loss not deductible. 
. . . . 
   The declaration of the confiscatory act as a “theft” solely for purposes of 
federal income taxation should not interfere with international relations 
because it does not require the imposition of Western ideologies upon non-
Western nations.  The expropriating nation will not be affected by this 
characterization . . . . 
Id. at 228-29 (footnotes omitted). 




B.  Menzel, Facts, and the Act of State Doctrine 
Almost forty years ago in a private ownership dispute case, a New 
York court determined that the seizure by the ERR of a privately owned 
Chagall painting was an act of plunder or pillage under international and 
military law, and therefore not lawful.60  Mr. and Mrs. Menzel lived in 
Brussels until March 1941 when they fled from the oncoming Nazis.  
They had hurriedly left their apartment and its furnishings, including a 
painting by Marc Chagall.  Treating this as “decadent Jewish art,” the 
painting, along with other works of art, was seized and a receipt was left 
by the ERR indicating the property was taken for “safekeeping.”61  After 
the war, the Menzels searched for the painting unsuccessfully until 1962 
when it was located in the possession of the defendant List, who had 
purchased the painting in good faith in 1955.  Mrs. Menzel (Mr. Menzel 
having died) brought a replevin suit to recover the painting.  A jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Menzel finding that the painting 
belonged unqualifiedly to Mrs. Menzel, and that it was looted and stolen 
from her apartment. 
On a motion to set aside the verdict, the court determined the seizure 
was not lawful and the Act of State doctrine did not apply to preclude 
the court’s inquiry into the validity of acts of the Nazis.62  The court 
carefully considered the four factors necessary for the Act of State 
doctrine to apply, and held that none of the four was met. 
The first factor is that the taking must be by a foreign sovereign 
government.  In the Menzel case, the Chagall was taken by the ERR, 
determined by the court to be an organ of the Nazi party and not a 
foreign sovereign government.63  Second, the taking must be within the 
territory of the foreign government.  Assuming arguendo that the taking 
was by Germany, the Chagall was taken from the Menzel’s residence in 
Brussels in 1941.  German military occupation did not make Brussels 
part of Germany; the Kingdom of Belgium was the recognized 
government of Belgium, though in exile.64  Third, the foreign government 
must be extant and recognized by the United States at the time of the 
suit.  The Third Reich had collapsed with its surrender in 1945 and, 
therefore, was not in existence when Mrs. Menzel filed her lawsuit.65  
 60. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966). 
 61. Id. at 806. 
 62. Id. at 812.  In doing so, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 63. Id. at 813-15. 
 64. Id. at 815-16. 
 65. Id. at 816. 
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Fourth, the taking must not violate any treaty obligation.  Belgium, 
Germany, and the United States all signed the 1907 Hague Convention 
Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land.  That convention 
formally forbade pillage.  The court noted that the “pillage so rampant 
during the Nazi occupation was specifically held to be in violation” of 
the 1907 Hague Convention by the Nuremberg trials.66  For many Nazi-
looted art disputes, some, if not all four, of these factors will be similar. 
C.  Divining Congressional Intent on Foreign Expropriation 
The Farcasanu court had another reason supporting its application of 
the Act of State doctrine to bar a theft loss deduction.  In 1964, Congress 
added new section 165(i), since repealed, to specifically allow a 
deduction for losses arising from the confiscation of nonbusiness 
property by the Cuban government between 1958 and 1964.67  These 
were to be treated as losses “to which paragraph (3) of subsection (c) 
applies.”68  No Committee Report discusses this new subsection, as it 
was added as an amendment from the Senate floor.  The Conference 
Report merely states that such losses shall be treated as losses from 
“other casualty.”69  For the Tax Court, this enactment removed “any doubt” 
as to congressional intent and understanding as to the scope of theft 
under section 165(c)(3) for foreign expropriation.70
It is possible, however, that section 165(i) had more grounding in the 
practical politics of the Cold War era than in tax doctrine.  Cuba’s 
proximity to the United States may have increased the number of U.S. 
taxpayers, and hence voters, directly affected by Castro’s nationalization.  
Section 165(i) could have been added to smooth the way for taxpayers’ 
Cuban claims, for by declaring Cuban expropriation losses to be 
statutorily deductible, individual taxpayers would not bear the burden of 
 66. Id. at 817. 
 67. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 238, 78 Stat. 19, 128, repealed by 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(26), 90 Stat. 1520, 1767. 
 68. Id.  For a brief history of former section 165(i), see also Ogden v. United 
States, 432 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff’d 555 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 69. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1149 (1964) (Conf. Rept.), as reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1940, 1992; see also Rev. Rul. 65-87, 1965-1 C.B. 111 (“[A]ny loss of 
property (not used in a trade or business or for income-producing purposes) resulting 
from expropriation . . . by the Government of Cuba . . . is treated as a loss from a 
casualty within the meaning of section 165(c)(3) of the Code . . . .”). 
 70. Farcasanu v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 881, 890 (1968), aff’d, 436 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 




proving “other casualty.”71  That Congress took specific action in the 
instance of Cuban expropriation apparently deeming it an “other 
casualty,” does not logically mean an individual taxpayer is foreclosed 
from proving a theft in another context. 
Even if Farcasanu was correct in its perception of congressional 
policy on expropriation for tax purposes, does it remain defining for the 
still reverberating Nazi-looted art?  Section 803 of the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, another enactment with scant 
legislative history, may provide a fresher perspective on congressional 
intent.  Under that section, payments received by an eligible U.S. taxpayer 
as restitution arising from the Holocaust are excluded from gross income 
for federal income tax purposes.72  Section 803 reflects the principles of 
the late 1998 international conference convened by the United States 
concerning Nazi-era assets, including Swiss bank accounts, insurance, and 
other corporate transactions.73  As a result of this United States led 
initiative, over $8 billion has been paid to Holocaust survivors, their 
heirs, and charitable organizations.74
Normally, gross income includes interest, dividends, and any gains 
derived from dealings in property, but does not include a mere return of 
one’s original property.  To the extent, therefore, that restitution payments 
include as a measure of restitution amounts for the interest, dividends, 
and gains beyond one’s actual original property, there would be income 
for tax purposes absent section 803.  In contrast, the return of the 
original property, such as art, would not give rise to income to the 
owner.  Nevertheless section 803 specifically excludes from gross income 
the value of the actual “assets stolen or hidden from, or otherwise lost” 
that are returned to the taxpayer.75  This unnecessary overinclusiveness 
of the exclusion speaks to its normative, as opposed to fiscal, value. In 
 71. Epstein, supra note 51, at 220.  It is interesting to note that Fidel Castro  
appropriated works of art from private collectors that are also now starting to appear on 
the world auction market.  See Celestine Bohlen, Reclaiming Art Caught in the Cuban 
Revolution: In Cases Reminiscent of Looted Nazi Art, Emigres Trace Fate of their 
Collections, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, sec. E, col. 2; Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Castro’s 
Art Theft Puts Sotheby’s on the Spot, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2004, at A15. 
 72. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. No. 107-
16, § 803, 115 Stat. 38, 149 [hereinafter EGTRRA § 803]. 
 73. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 74. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 686-87 (“The United States has been the 
prime mover behind the numerous agreements concluded between 1998 and 2001 . . . . 
These settlements brought about by the U.S. government and in U.S. courts . . . have 
now reached a figure somewhere between $8 to $11 billion . . . .”). 
 75. EGTRRA § 803. 
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the words of its Senate sponsor, “[t]he federal government should not 
make one dime on Holocaust restitution, ever.”76
That a transferee does not have income upon the receipt of returned 
property does not mean the transferor does or does not have a corresponding 
deduction upon the transfer.  Symmetry of treatment between two parties 
to a transaction is not required by tax policy or practice.  Each party is to 
account separately for the transaction.  Consequently section 803’s non-
tax impact on the transferee is not decisive on the issue of a transferor’s 
deduction.  What section 803 does underscore, however, is an articulated 
United States policy, including tax, supporting resolution of Nazi-era 
claims.77
With this rather elliptical history in mind, can an innocent buyer of 
Nazi-looted art now legitimately claim a theft loss deduction when that 
work of art must be returned to the heirs?  Resolving the two additional 
section 165(c)(3) issues of timing and meaning of art theft will be 
critical to the decision. 
D.  Timing 
Virtually all theft loss cases pose the situation of the taxpayer as the 
direct victim of the thief and the consequent theft; there are no 
intermediary transfers.  The question of a time delay in a theft scenario 
was addressed early in the statute and easily resolved in favor of the 
 76. 148 CONG. REC. 151, S11796 (2002) (statement of Senator Fitzgerald 
regarding the Holocaust Restitution Tax Fairness Act of 2002).  The Act removed 
EGTRA’s December 31, 2010 sunset provision from application to section 803.  Id.
 77. Section 202 of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act provides: 
It is the sense of Congress that consistent with the 1907 Hague Convention, all 
governments should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of 
private and public property, such as works of art, to the rightful owners in 
cases where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period of 
Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof that the claimant is the rightful owner. 
Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112 Stat. 15, 17-18 (1998).  Judicial reluctance in the United 
States to term the Nazi looting of art as theft may be waning.  Recently, the Supreme 
Court characterized the Nazi regime as engaging “not only in genocide and enslavement 
but theft of Jewish assets.”  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).  
See also Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, stating that “the Nazi regimentation of inhumanity 
we characterize as the Holocaust, marked most horrifically by genocide and 
enslavement, also entailed widespread destruction, confiscation, and theft of property 
belonging to Jews.”  Id. at 430.  The Nuremberg trials themselves, where criminal 
charges over the looting of art were alleged and proven, should not be ignored.  See 
generally The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).  See also Sue Choi, The Legal 
Landscape of the International Art Market After Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 198-99 (2005).




taxpayer: a theft was deemed sustained for purposes of the deduction 
when it was discovered.78  The lapse of time is not, therefore, by 
statutory pronouncement, fatal to the deduction.  Yet when presented 
with a theft loss deduction claimed by an innocent purchaser one or 
more sales transactions removed from the thief, the circuits are split, as 
illustrated by the following cases. 
1.  Boothe v. Commissioner 
In 1960, Mr. Boothe sold his interest in certain Soldier’s Additional 
Homestead Rights, which he had purchased in 1959.79  These rights were 
originally granted to certain soldiers who served in the Civil War, and 
allowed them to apply for and receive a fee interest in certain federal 
lands.  These rights were freely assignable.  Mr. Boothe’s rights were 
traceable to William H. Dooley, Jr., the original grantee, who perfected 
his claim in 1873.  Twenty-five years later in 1898, Mr. Dooley assigned 
all of his rights to claim 120 acres to Mr. Black.  Thereafter in 1916, Mr. 
Dooley again sold all his rights (in three assignments of forty acres each) 
to B.A. Mason.  Thirty-five years after his purchase, Mr. Mason sold one 
of the forty acre assignments to Mr. Davis in 1951.  It was from Mr. 
Davis’s estate in 1959 that Mr. Boothe purchased the disputed rights for 
$4400.  Mr. Boothe attempted to exercise his rights in the State of 
Washington, but the land he desired was not available under this 
program.  Fourteen months later, Mr. Boothe then sold his interest to R. 
L. Spoo for $8000, reporting a gain of $3600 on his income tax return.  
Mr. Spoo’s designee attempted to exercise the rights on land in Nevada, 
but like in Mr. Boothe’s attempt, that land was not available.  The 
Bureau of Land Management, however, held that the rights were valid.  
When a second attempt to exercise the rights was made with respect to 
land in Oregon, the Bureau held the rights invalid due to the 1898 
assignment to Mr. Black. 
Mr. Spoo then sued Mr. Boothe for breach of warranty of title, 
recovering a judgment of $20,792 in damages.  Mr. Boothe paid the 
judgment in 1977 and claimed a theft loss deduction on his income tax 
return.  The Commissioner denied the theft loss deduction since Mr. 
Boothe was not the victim of a theft. 
The sole issue before the Tax Court was the characterization of the 
$20,792 judgment paid by Mr. Boothe as either a theft loss under section 
165(c) or a capital loss under section 165(f).80  The practical difference 
 78. 26 U.S.C.  § 165(e) (2006). 
 79. Boothe v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 804 (1984), rev’d, 768 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(per curiam). 
 80. Id. at 805. 
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is quantitative; that is, for capital losses in excess of capital gains, there 
is only a modest deduction allowed,81 whereas a theft loss was at the 
time almost wholly deductible.82  Applying the origin of the claim 
doctrine, the majority Tax Court opinion supported by ten judges 
decided that the 1977 judgment arose from the 1960 sale to Mr. Spoo.83  
Hence, under the principle of Arrowsmith, the loss originated in a capital 
transaction and was therefore a capital loss.84  It was consequently 
unnecessary for the majority to determine if a taxpayer who is not the 
direct victim can claim the deduction as a theft loss.85  Two dissenting 
opinions supported by eight judges were filed.86
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in a brief per curiam opinion, noted that 
the “unusual facts in this case created sharp differences of opinion . . . . 
We agree with and adopt the dissenting opinion of Judge Körner.”87  In 
 81. 26 U.S.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(b) (1977). 
 82. As in effect in 1977, a theft loss was allowable as a deduction only to the 
extent the loss from each theft exceeded $100.  Id.  Today there is an additional 
quantitative limitation in section 165(h)(2), essentially allowing personal casualty losses 
only to the extent such personal casualty losses exceed ten percent of the taxpayer’s 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI).  See U.S.C. § 165(h)(2) (2006). 
 83. Boothe, 82 T.C. at 807. 
   The deductions claimed by petitioners were for a judgment of damages and 
court costs.  The inquiry as to the character of the deduction should, therefore, 
focus upon the nature of the litigation.  Where litigation involves the 
acquisition or disposition of capital assets, the origin and character of the claim 
is the controlling test . . . . Although most of the cases involving this issue 
relate to deductibility under section 162 or section 212, there is no reason why 
the test should not be applied to a deduction claimed under section 165. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Judge Hamblen’s dissent offers “several reasons to resist such 
expansion.”  Id. at 812; see also Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the 
Claim Test: A Search for Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97, 119-21 (1997). 
 84. “In Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) . . . . [t]he Supreme Court held 
that the payments by the taxpayers were allowable only as capital losses because they 
arose from the earlier capital transaction.  We conclude that the principle of Arrowsmith 
applies here.”  Boothe, 82 T.C. at 808. 
 85. “In view of our holding based upon the origin-of-the-claim test, it is 
unnecessary for us to decide whether a taxpayer who is not the direct victim of a theft is 
entitled to deduct a theft loss.”  Id. at 809. 
 86. Judge Körner’s dissent (discussed infra) was joined only by Judge Whitaker.  
Id. at 812.  Judge Hamblen’s dissent was joined by five Tax Court Judges.  Id. at 819.  
Judge Hamblen’s dissent first rejects the “expansion” of the origin of the claim test to 
section 165, then addresses the “principal question now sidestepped by the majority” and 
resolves “the victim proximity issue” in the taxpayer’s favor.  Id. at 812. 
 87. Boothe v. Comm’r, 768 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).  The 
sharpest difference was between the ten judge majority opinion (which viewed the case 
wholly through an origin of the claim prism) and Judge Hamblen’s six judge dissent (which 
viewed the case wholly through a theft loss prism).  See Schnee & Stara, supra note 83. 




his dissenting opinion in the Tax Court, Judge Körner viewed the case as 
involving two distinct and separate events.88  The first was a theft “even 
though (Boothe) was not the immediate purchaser from the fraudulent 
vendor.”89  This theft occurred in 1959 when Mr. Boothe purchased his 
interest, but it was discovered by the taxpayer only when litigation was 
concluded in 1977, and thus deductible in 1977.90  Under section 165(b), 
the basis for determining the amount of any loss is the adjusted basis of 
the property.  Consequently, Mr. Boothe’s theft loss was his basis, or 
$4400.  The second event concerned the remaining $16,392 in damages, 
proceeding from the breach of warranty of title lawsuit.  Judge Körner 
agreed with the majority’s origin of the claim analysis sustaining the 
capital loss in the amount of $16,392.91
The Ninth Circuit in Boothe removed the perceived obstacle of direct 
connection between the thief and victim, and did so when the theft 
spanned forty-three to sixty-one years (from the fraudulent sale by Mr. 
Dooley in 1916, to Mr. Boothe’s innocent purchase in 1959, to 
discovery in 1977), multiple purchasers (Mr. Mason to Mr. Davis, to Mr. 
Boothe), and apparent judicial and administrative acceptance of validity 
(inclusion in Mr. Davis’s estate, and Bureau of Land Management 
holding).  These attributes of time, multiple sales, and apparent title/ 
acceptance will often be present in the Nazi-looted art cases.  This 
makes Boothe very citable, but the sharp differences in opinion noted by 
the Ninth Circuit persist. 
2.  Krahmer v. United States 
In 1985, the same year the Ninth Circuit decided Boothe, the claims 
court decided Krahmer v. United States, another theft loss deduction 
case.92  In Krahmer not only was the timing of the alleged theft an issue, 
but another issue, particularly pertinent in art cases, also emerged.  The 
distinction between losses attributable to thefts involving art and those to 
 88. “[T]he majority and Judge Hamblen have taken an overly simplistic view of 
the facts . . . by telescoping the relevant events which occurred here, so as to produce a 
single transaction giving rise to a deductible loss, rather than two distinct and separable 
events having different tax consequences.”  Boothe, 82 T.C. at 809 (Körner, J., 
dissenting).  By separating the loss into two component parts, Judge Körner was able to 
bridge the two myopic competing views. 
 89. Id. at 810. 
 90. Id.  (“I would therefore hold that he suffered a theft loss in 1959, when he 
purchased the nonexistent rights, in the amount of $4,400, which, not being discovered 
until 1977, was deductible by him in that year under section 165(e), subject to the 
limiting provisions of section 165(c)(3).”). 
 91. See id. at 811 for the computation. 
 92. Krahmer v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 49 (1985), aff’d in part, 810 F.2d 1145 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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misattribution or authenticity raised concerns about the scope and 
meaning of theft involving art for tax purposes. 
Mr. Krahmer had purchased over the years many paintings from Mr. 
Mitscherlich, an art dealer.  Two paintings proved problematic.  One was 
attributed by the art dealer to Nicholas Poussin.  Mr. Krahmer had paid 
$30,000 for the Poussin painting, which he later sold for $2000 when it 
was determined not to be by Poussin, but by Poussin’s nephew instead.  
The second painting bore the signature of “W. M. Chase” and the taxpayer 
paid $5000 for it.  The Chase signature on the painting was later 
determined to be a forgery and the painting was thereafter sold for only 
$300, resulting in a $4700 loss.  The taxpayer claimed theft losses arising 
from each transaction. 
The Krahmer trial court denied a theft loss deduction for misattribution 
of the Poussin painting.  The court determined that since there was no 
forgery but only “an erroneous statement by the seller as to the likely 
artist,” it would be necessary for the taxpayer to establish that the seller 
defrauded the taxpayer by “knowingly and intentionally misattributing” 
the work.93  The taxpayer’s evidence as to the dealer’s status as an 
experienced art expert, although not a Poussin specialist, as well as his 
allegations concerning the dealer’s course of conduct as implying deceit 
were unpersuasive as to knowing and intentional misattribution. 
The trial court, however, drew a clear and easy distinction between the 
two paintings.  It allowed the deduction for the second painting, with the 
forged Chase signature, as ipso facto fraudulent: “Unlike the ‘Poussin,’ 
the ‘Chase’ painting was signed, and that signature was a forgery.  Thus, 
anyone who sustained a loss on purchase in the belief that the painting 
was by William Merritt Chase was the victim of a theft by false 
pretenses or swindle.”94
As to the government’s contention that the taxpayer must be the direct 
victim of the forger, the trial court was not persuaded: 
It is apparent that Congress’ concern was not to punish the wrongdoer but to 
provide tax relief to the victim of the loss . . . .  The intended connection is 
between the taxpayer and the loss, or more specifically in this case between the 
taxpayer and the theft, not between the taxpayer and the thief.  Thus, it should 
make no difference in the application of this relief statute whether the taxpayer 
dealt directly with the forger or was the victim once or several steps removed.95
. . . . 
 93. Id. at 53. 
 94. Id. at 52. 
 95. Id. (emphasis in original). 




Here, plaintiff has suffered a loss at the hands of a forger, however distant in 
time or privity was the forger’s act.  Plaintiff need not know the identity of the 
forger.  He need only prove that the forgery was the cause of the loss.  By his 
discovery of the forgery, perpetrated by persons unknown, plaintiff has satisfied 
his burden.96
On appeal in 1987, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
lower court’s determination that the “mere existence of the forged 
signature . . . was sufficient to prove a theft by false pretenses is incorrect 
as a matter of law, and . . . reverse[d] it.”97  Significantly the Federal 
Circuit held that the taxpayer was required to show that the art dealer, 
from whom the taxpayer had purchased the painting, knowingly and 
intentionally defrauded him by the misattribution.  The court required an 
active deception at the time of the taxpayer’s purchase, reasserting a 
direct link between the thief and the taxpayer.  Interestingly, although 
the lower court had discussed the Boothe decision extensively,98 the 
Federal Circuit did not distinguish or even reference Boothe on appeal.99
3.  Suddenness and Mistakes 
What is the underlying concern of the IRS in requiring direct contact 
between the thief and the taxpayer?  The answer may be nothing more 
than an unexamined historic imperative, the traditional section 165(c)(3) 
suddenness requirement, or with shades of Mary Frances Allen and her 
brooch, distinguishing theft from mistake. 
Recall that section 165(c) limits an individual’s nonbusiness, 
nonprofitseeking losses to those losses arising “from fire, storm, shipwreck, 
 96. Id. at 53. 
 97. Krahmer v. United States, 810 F.2d 1145, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 98. See Krahmer, 9 Cl. Ct. at 53. 
 99. Six years later, however, the Tax Court in another left loss deduction case did 
make an approving reference.  See Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 546 
(1993).  The Jensens had unknowingly invested in a Ponzi scheme run by Chacklan 
Enterprises.  Id. at 544.  The taxpayers’ actual investment was through their long-trusted 
broker, Mr. Howarter, and not directly with Chacklan.  Id.  Like his clients, Mr. 
Howarter was not a knowing participant in the Ponzi scheme.  Id. at 545.  Once the 
scheme collapsed later in the same year, the taxpayers claimed a theft loss deduction, 
which the Service denied.  Id. at 545, 546.  Although the Service agreed a theft had 
occurred, it argued the taxpayers were not entitled to a theft deduction because they were 
not direct investors in Chacklan Enterprises.  Id. at 546.  The Tax Court determined as a 
factual matter, however, that the taxpayers were investors in Chacklan, specifically 
stating that “[t]here is no requirement that an investor have direct contact with the entity 
in which he is investing.”  Id.  Jensen is noteworthy because the Tax Court cited Boothe 
in the face of a pointed IRS argument that there was no direct contact between the 
taxpayer and the thief.  See id.  However tempting it is to read Jensen as an endorsement 
by the Tax Court of Boothe’s no-direct-contact-required, such an unqualified statement 
in unwarranted.  First, the court found that the taxpayers were investors in Chacklan.  Id.  
Second, because the Jensens were Nevada residents, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Boothe governed.  See id. at 544. 
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or other casualty, or from theft.”  In interpreting “other casualty,” courts 
adopted the principle of ejusdem generis, that is, interpret the phrase in 
light of the surrounding terms.100  Consequently, deductible losses from 
“other casualty” require an identifiable event that is “sudden, cataclysmic, 
and devastating,”101 or “of a sudden, unusual or unexpected nature”102 
put most simply, “only sudden events can be deductible casualties.”103  If 
the tincture of time underlies deductibility for “fire, storm, shipwreck, or 
other casualty,” it may, consciously or not, also color the interpretation 
of “or from theft.” 
A second rationale for the IRS insistence on a direct link between the 
thief and the taxpayer may be an institutional belief that defining theft in 
a hard edged way, making theft a fortress, best distinguishes theft from 
mere “loss.”  Mary Frances Allen and her missing brooch illustrates the 
slippery slope the IRS intends to avoid.  In the context of art, the slippery 
slope includes the critical distinction between theft and misattribution.  
A time honored method of art education is for students to copy the 
masters—there is no criminal intent at the time.104  As time passes, 
 100. See, for example, White v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967) holding 
that the loss of a diamond from a ring when a hand was slammed in a door was a 
casualty loss: 
The principle of ejusdem generis as it is presently applied does no violence to 
congressional intent.  Its application has been consistently broadened so that 
wherever unexpected, accidental force is exerted on property and the taxpayer 
is powerless to prevent application of the force because of the suddenness 
thereof or some disability, the resulting direct and proximate damage causes a 
loss which is like or similar to losses arising from the causes specifically 
enumerated in section 165(c)(3). 
 101. Popa v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 130, 132 (1979), acq. in result 1981-2 C.B. 2. 
 102. Rev. Rul. 63-232, 1963-2 C.B. 97. 
 103. Joel S. Newman, Of Taxes and Other Casualties, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 964 
(1983) (“Perhaps the problem is one of timing.  It is generally easy to determine when a 
deductible casualty occurs, especially since, under current law, only sudden events can 
be deductible casualties.”). 
 104. Of course, not all copies proceed from purely academic motives.  In State v. 
Wright Hepburn Webster Gallery, Ltd., 314 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1970), the New York 
Attorney General unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a sale of paintings advertised as 
created by “Master Forger David Stein.”  At the time, Mr. Stein was in a Paris jail for 
selling art forgeries.  Id. at 663.  The court noted: 
[H]e has apparently been permitted by the French authorities to produce 
paintings “in the style of” such renowned artists as Chagall, Matisse, Picasso, 
Braque and others, subject to the proviso that they bear his own signature, 
“Stein, D.,” rather than the simulated signatures of these masters as had been 
his prior practice. 
Id.  The Attorney General was concerned that over time Mr. Stein’s signature would be 
removed and the works would enter the art market as original works.  Id. at 664.  The 




certainty decreases and confusion increases.  To shift to the U.S. tax 
system a measure of monetary liability for mistakes in judgment should 
require a higher threshold of congressional intent.  A lower threshold 
would greatly increase the availability of the theft deduction in personal 
transactions where the underlying transaction concerned judgment and 
not theft.  The U.S. tax system would then become an insurer of sorts not 
only for theft but mistakes in judgment as well, something Congress did 
not intend. 
A third rationale for requiring a nexus between thief and taxpayer is 
that to allow otherwise could ultimately blur the tax distinctions between 
generally deductible business losses and generally nondeductible 
personal losses, so that all losses become deductible.105  Moreover, in the 
context of Nazi-looted art, the original illegal taking may not have 
involved a U.S. taxpayer at the time of the Nazi regime’s theft.  The U.S. 
taxpayer became involved generally only over time and with the passage 
of the work of art through the international art market.  Allowing the 
U.S. tax system to address an injury to a non-U.S. taxpayer from sixty 
years ago could result in an unwarranted expansion of section 165.  This 
limited view of the time of injury however, ignores the reality of the 
ongoing injury to the current U.S. taxpayer.  The injury began in World 
War II and continues. 
V.  POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF USING THE TAX CODE 
Whether or not the Internal Revenue Code can be used as a tool for 
resolving Nazi-looted art cases, the broader question is whether it should 
be so used.  Do any policy considerations support or defeat the use?  
Unquestionably, the law should assist people in resolving disputes; so 
to the extent tax consequences can help resolve honest disputes, 
especially between two innocents, this is a positive step.  Yet any 
attempt to shift financial liability from an individual taxpayer to all 
taxpayers raises legitimate concerns.  These include direct tax policy 
concerns, such as revenue loss, vertical equity, and conceptual concerns, 
and non-tax concerns, such as the United States increasingly becoming 
an art theft haven. 
court was not persuaded that the Attorney General’s suspicion of future misconduct 
qualified as a current nuisance, and the sale was allowed.  Id. at 664, 668. 
 105. Something of this sort may also underlie the issue concerning the availability 
of the theft loss deduction for stock losses attributable to Enron- or WorldCom-type 
conduct.  See I.R.S. Notice 2004-27, 2004-16 I.R.B. 782; Robert Willens, Financial 
Misrepresentations by Management May Lead to ‘Theft’ Losses for Corporate 
Stockholders, DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 29, 2005, at J1 (“[W]e can safely conclude that the 
indispensable key to the claim that a theft loss has been sustained . . . is the legal concept 
of privity . . . .”). 
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A.  Revenue Loss 
Inherently, deductions lower the amount of tax collected.106  As a 
purely academic discussion, no estimate as to revenue cost exists; but the 
cost, relative to the entirety of the income tax system, would probably not 
be significant.  In determining the amount of the loss, the taxpayer’s 
basis is the starting point, not fair market value.107  In addition, since 
1983, section 165(h) has imposed a quantitative restriction limiting theft 
loss deductions to those in excess of ten percent of a taxpayer’s AGI.108  
This quantitative restriction, coupled with the deduction’s availability 
only in the year the loss is sustained without carryover or carryback, 
suggests that the utility of the theft loss deduction will be limited.  
Moreover, structural limitations applicable across the board to all 
taxpayers, including the phase out of itemized deductions and the 
possible imposition of the Alternative Minimum Tax, could similarly limit 
the revenue loss.  One might well wonder, in fact, if these quantitative 
limitations and restrictions defeat using the theft loss in this context as a 
practical matter. 
B.  Vertical Equity 
Equity considerations, however, appear more troublesome.109  Because 
the art most likely to be in controversy will be of great value,110 the 
ownership of such works similarly is most likely to be concentrated in 
the high income bracket taxpayer.  Thus, high income taxpayers would 
likely stand to benefit the most from the application of the theft loss 
deduction to Nazi art restitution cases.  For some commentators, that 
would be enough to reject the application. 
 106. This is admittedly a general proposition; in any particular case a deduction 
could be “wasted” because there is insufficient income to absorb it. 
 107. 26 U.S.C. § 165(b) (2000). 
 108. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 
203(b), 96 Stat. 324, 422. 
 109. Horizontal equity concerns, such as the concern that similarly situated taxpayers 
should be treated similarly, are notoriously difficult to address, particularly when unique 
works were stolen over sixty years ago.  Who is the similarly situated taxpayer?  Is it one 
who purchased the painting unwittingly directly from the thief?  Or is it someone who 
bought a Degas only to have it stolen from her home?  In any case, it is hard to see the 
difference from a tax perspective because the taxpayer no longer has the painting.
 110. See TRIENENS, supra note 30, at 97 (“I am almost at the point of saying that if 
the art isn’t worth $3 million, don’t go after it.”) (quoting Thomas Kline, counsel for the 
Gutmann family in the Degas dispute).




This observation of high end utility should not be sufficient in and of 
itself to reject the application of the theft loss deduction.  Any allowable 
deduction in our system is more valuable to a higher bracket taxpayer 
than to a lower bracket taxpayer; such is the nature of progressive 
rates.111  As long as the deduction is available to all, the equity of its 
lopsided use should cause consideration of the deduction’s purpose.  
Although limited, the legislative history suggests deductible section 
165(c)(3) losses are those that are extraordinary and nonrecurring, 
“beyond the average or usual losses incurred by most taxpayers in day-
to-day living,” and that are sufficient in size to have a significant effect 
upon an individual’s ability to pay federal income taxes.112
Applying this standard, an ownership dispute over a work of art 
stemming from Nazi confiscation over sixty years ago handily meets the 
extraordinary standard; one hopes it meets the nonrecurring standard for 
that taxpayer, and the sufficient in size standard has arguably been 
addressed by the ten percent norm.  The ability-to-pay reference is more 
difficult to address because of its uncertain meaning in this context.  
Does the loss of a work of art compromise the taxpayer’s ability to pay 
income taxes?  Arguably not, since the art does not generate dollars with 
which to pay tax.  This argument proves too much since items of 
nonbusiness, nonprofit seeking personal property generally do not 
generate income subject to tax.  If the ability-to-pay standard is suggesting 
that the taxpayer will need to spend income to replace the stolen 
property, this is uncertain in our context given the uniqueness of the 
work and acknowledging that art, unlike a home, is not a necessity that 
must be replaced.  The ability-to-pay argument should not be determinative 
because in the context of section 165(c)(3)’s history, normative concerns 
about the taxpayer’s victimization by outside, sudden, uncontrollable 
forces seem more important. 
C.  Conceptual Concerns 
The Haig-Simons income formulation provides a recognized starting 
point in articulating a conceptual framework for the income tax.  Under 
the formula, income is “the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
 111. The U.S. income tax system is highly stratified.  Most American taxpayers pay 
more in payroll taxes than they pay in income tax; most individual income tax returns 
claim the standard deduction rather than itemized deductions.  See EDWARD J. 
MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT 17-19 (2002). 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 88-749, at 52 (1963); S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 57 (1964). 
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question.”113  Using the theft loss deduction when returning Nazi-looted 
art to the original owner can be seen as consistent with the Haig-Simons 
formulation as there has been an overall reduction in the taxpayer’s store 
of property rights.114  The charitable deduction is more problematic as 
two offsetting effects arguably exist.  By transferring the art work to a 
charity, the taxpayer, as in the theft loss scenario, has decreased the 
value of his store of property rights.  But by choosing to effect that same 
transfer as a gratuitous donation, the taxpayer may be seen as exercising 
rights of consumption by foregoing a sale.  Nevertheless, by the 
longstanding policy considerations underlying the charitable deduction, 
such charitable dispositions are not considered as giving rise to income.  
Congress has chosen to encourage transfers to charities, presumably 
since the charities assist the government in fulfilling some of its public 
functions. 
D.  Non-Tax Considerations 
A traditional apprehension is that deductions that proceed from 
normative, noneconomic concerns are inappropriate in the tax system 
and contribute needlessly to the complexity of the system.115  Many 
commentators today acknowledge that a pure tax system is unlikely and 
acknowledge, if not support, recognition of such in the tax system.  As 
previously discussed, the tax system has already been used recently to 
address Nazi-era reparations.116  But would the norm of a tax settlement 
in these cases have a negative ripple effect elsewhere?  Would tax 
settlements increase the flow of illicit art to the United States or lower a 
buyer’s diligence in purchasing if the buyer is aware the tax system may 
be a partner at the ready when the purchase goes bad?  Is there not 
something distasteful about United States charities and museums being 
used as conduits or repositories for looted art?  The answer to each of 
these questions is probably yes.  The questions, however, miss the mark. 
The goal is to support the return of Nazi-looted art consistent with 
stated United States policy.  Nazi looting of art is an historic fact.  If 
 113. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). 
 114. Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions—A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another 
“Deal”?, 2002 MICH. L. REV. DETROIT C.L. 1, 37-40 (2002). 
 115. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit 
Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 
STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979). 
 116. See discussion supra Part III. 




more of it resurfaces, whether in the United States or elsewhere, that is a 
good thing, as finding the art is the first step in returning the art to its 
original owner.  To counter a possible increase in the flow of illicit art 
into the United States, three practical points might be addressed.  First, 
lawmakers could limit use of the theft loss deduction to cases involving 
the restitution of Nazi-looted art, and not any stolen art, to the victim.  
Second, lawmakers could restrict the tax deduction to Nazi-looted art 
formally entered on a recognized international registry for Nazi-looted 
art as of a certain date.  Finally, in order to deal with the problem of 
“fake” Nazi-looted art, the Service should require expert testimony from 
a qualified appraiser as to authenticity as part of the taxpayer’s return. 
Due diligence on the part of buyers is unlikely to decrease substantially 
because of a deduction.  No one wants to lose money, and a deduction is 
of course only a partial recovery of money spent, unlike a credit.  
Moreover, much of the contested art was purchased years ago when 
buyers’ diligence passively relied on the reputation of art galleries.  
Today, with the ready availability of Internet database searches and the 
steady drumbeat of news stories, buyers can fairly be held to a higher,  
active standard of diligence.  The passage of time thus has more likely 
increased the due diligence of buyers, and one can rightly question the 
bona fides of recent purchases. 
Charities as conduits and museums as repositories for art of questionable 
provenance does seem distasteful at first.117  In the long run, however, 
the art returns to the original owners, or with their agreement and 
approval, to a wider public ownership. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Six decades after the end of World War II, controversies over the 
ownership of Nazi-looted art continue to emerge.  Time has worked a 
shift in perceptions and expectations for those controversies; time is no 
longer an ally for the repose of title.  This unsettling of bona fide 
expectations of title for an innocent buyer raises claims in law and in 
equity that are equally meritorious to those of the original owners.  For a 
legal system that adjudicates on a case-by-case basis, a claim over 
ownership of a unique work of art is a zero sum game—one winner, one 
loser.  This harsh reality of uniqueness, set against the competing 
interests of legitimate market concerns and demands of restorative 
justice, requires fresh and open inquiry into workable solutions. 
 117. This issue is not new for museums.  Only recently, however, is the issue  
discussed widely in a forthright manner.  See Hugh Eakin & Elisabetta Povoledo, Met’s 
Fears on Looted Antiquities Are Not New, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at E1. 
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Tax is an eminently practical system that affords two possible 
strategies for those ownership disputes.  Using the charitable deduction 
would generally resolve the dispute by creating an outright public 
ownership, and hence public benefit and oversight.  Using the theft loss 
deduction, ownership would generally remain private, but the public 
would nevertheless bear some of the direct financial costs in the 
ownership shift from one party to the other.  The public benefit is 
admittedly less direct: assistance in dispute resolution, support for private 
ownership of property, and protection of legitimate market expectations.  
Perhaps because of this imbalance in public costs and benefits, the 
availability of the theft loss deduction may not be as straightforward as 
the charitable deduction.  Time, manifested by the IRS’s apparent 
requirement of direct nexus between the thief and the taxpayer, should 
not act as a stumbling block for the theft loss deduction strategy in the 
limited context of Nazi-looted art.  The language of the Code does not 
require the nexus and perhaps even recognizes a different timeframe for 
theft.  Case law support for tracing the theft back in time through 
multiple purchases does exist.  Finally, general tax policy concerns do 
not and should not outweigh the stated United States policy to assist in 
the restoration of Nazi-looted art.  The impossible eternal triangle of 
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